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Parry, Ian W.H.. |
Previous literature has shown that competition among regional governments may lead to inefficiently low levels of capital taxation, because governments do not take account of the external benefits of capital flight to other regions. However, the fiscal distortion is smaller the more elastic the supply of capital (for the region bloc), if governments are not perfectly competitive, or they behave in part as a revenue-maximizing Leviathan. There has been very little empirical work on the magnitude of the welfare effects of fiscal competition. This paper presents extensive calculations of the welfare effects using a model that incorporates the possibility of Leviathan behavior, strategic behavior by governments, monopsony power in factor markets, and a wide... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Fiscal competition; Tax harmonization; Welfare costs; Leviathan; Strategic behavior; Public Economics; H73; H21; H23. |
Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10848 |
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Parry, Ian W.H.. |
Certain types of expenditure--e.g. mortgage interest and medical insurance- receive favorable tax treatment and are effectively subsidized relative to other (non-tax-favored) expenditures. Labor taxes (e.g. income taxes) can therefore produce efficiency losses by distorting the allocation of consumption, in addition to distorting the labor market. Using evidence on the responsiveness of taxable income to changes in tax rates, a seminal study by Feldstein (1999) estimates that the marginal excess burden of taxation (MEB) could exceed unity, when the effects of tax deductions are taken into account. This is several times larger than in previous studies of the MEB that focus exclusively on labor market effects. This paper develops a "disaggregated" approach... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Welfare costs; Tax system; Tax deductions; Simulations; Political Economy; H21; H43. |
Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10801 |
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